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In the recent elections in Arab countries, Islamist parties performed very well. 
While this was expected from the political representatives of the Muslim Brother-
hood, the success of Salafist parties came as a surprise. This essay briefly analyses 
the ideology of Egypt’s most important Salafist party, Al-Nour, and gives a tenta-
tive suggestion on the future role of Islamist parties in Arab politics. 
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he Arab spring was not triggered by Islamist movements. On the contrary, 
when popular unrest began in late 2010, most of the representatives of political 
Islam stood by and only joined the protest movement reluctantly. In particular 
the leadership of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and religious leaders of the 
country’s Salafist movement had difficulties sharing the mood of the demon-
strations in Tahrir square. Yet in the recent elections in Tunisia and Egypt, polit-
ical parties with Islamist ideologies have been able to seize the momentum and 
gain the relative majority of the votes. For most observers, the successes of the 
Tunisian Ennahda party and the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the 
newly founded political branch of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, did not come 
as a surprise. For decades, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood represented the 
major political opposition to the Mubarak regime and it can look back on a his-
tory of engagement in electoral politics through alliance-making and the mus-
tering of independent candidates in Egypt’s so far very limited exercises in par-
liamentarian politics. Thus, the FJP’s 40 percent in the first round of Egypt’s 
current elections was to be expected, whereas the close to 25 percent for the 
“Alliance for Egypt”, a coalition of three Salafist parties, was the real surprise. 
Who are the Salafis and what kind of ideology do their parties represent? 
The Alliance for Egypt constitutes a coalition of three parties: Al-Nour, Al-
Asala and the Building and Development Party, the latter being the newly 
founded official political representative of the Jamaa al-Islamiyya which in the 
1980s and 1990s fought against the Egyptian regime with militant means. In this 
alliance, Al-Nour musters 85 percent of the joint candidates relegating the two 
other parties to marginal roles. Officially registered in June 2011, Al-Nour 
emerged from an in principle nation-wide missionary movement which has its 
major stronghold in Alexandria. Previously it was not known for its engage-
ment in oppositional activities but it rather represented a “quietist” religious 
movement tolerated by the Mubarak regime that perceived it as a counter-
balance to politically more verbal Islamist groups. In this sense, Al-Nour has 
evolved from the previously non-political stream of Salafism which also reject-
ed the justification of violent means of Jihadist groups with Salafist ideologies 
such as al-Qaida or the Egyptian Jamaat al-Islamiyya. 
Generally speaking, the ideologies of both the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafist groups go back to the Islamic reform movement of the nineteenth cen-
tury. Islamic reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897) or Mu-
hammad Abduh (1849-1905) reinterpreted Islamic traditions in the context of 
colonial domination, indigenous moves of modernization and the struggle for 
national independence. For them, the political liberation and the societal mod-
ernization of the Muslim world were closely associated with religious reform. 
The Islamic reform movement strongly criticized the religious establishment, 
the ulema, with their monopoly over the interpretation of Islamic traditions. 
They advocated a return to the “Golden Age of Islam”, according to the exam-
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ple set by the Prophet and his Companions (salaf), and demanded a fresh inter-
pretation of the original religious sources, the Koran and the Sunna (traditions 
of the prophet). Moreover, they employed the concept of the sharia (Islamic 
law) as a means of conscious reform for Muslim societies, thus initiating the 
subsequent “juridification” of Islamic norms and values which have character-
ized the sharia as a broad discursive field for centuries. In the course of the 
state-building processes of the twentieth century, the sharia then increasingly 
attained the character of a body of law that should be implemented by the coer-
cive power of the modern state.  
In their propagation of strict monotheism, their reliance on the Koran and the 
Sunna, their attempt to purify Islam in conformity with the example of the 
Prophet and their call for the implementation of the sharia, Salafist ideologies 
reflect this reformist tradition, however, in a very narrow, pietistic and funda-
mentalist way that has been influenced by the doctrines of Wahhabism, the offi-
cial interpretation of Sunni Islamic traditions by the religious establishment of 
Saudi Arabia. Contrary to the Muslim Brotherhood which began to engage po-
litically in changing Egyptian society soon after its foundation in 1928, Salafist 
groups have tended to focus on the purification of Islam through missionary 
activities, spreading their strict monotheism based on both their own reading of 
the original sources and the condemnation of popular ritual practices. The reli-
gious reformation of the individual Muslim according to the example of the 
Prophet, rather than the transformation of society by political means has charac-
terized mainstream Salafist ideologies. The general politicization of society in 
the course of the Arab spring seems to have changed this rather quietist ap-
proach of the Salafist movement. Yet, what kind of politics advocates the major 
political representative of this movement in Egypt, the Al-Nour party? 
A brief glance at the party’s website shows that also Salafist parties have tak-
en up the global discourse on democratic liberties and human rights 
(www.alnourparty.org). Under the heading “Realization of public liberties” 
(tahqiq al-huriyyat al-ama) the party explains Egypt’s “January Revolution” 
with the long-lasting absence of fundamental freedoms in the country. The par-
ty wants to guarantee these fundamental rights within the framework of the 
sharia, including the freedom of speech and press, the rule of law and the free-
dom of association. However, Al-Nour also takes the political economy of the 
Arab spring into consideration. Consequently, questions about reforms in the 
realms of agriculture, industries and the financial system are mentioned among 
its most important aims. For instance, the party identifies the problem of unem-
ployment as one of the major issues of reform. Relating it to questions of social 
justice, Al-Nour seems to advocate policies of an interventionist state, support-
ing small and medium sized enterprises, improving education and vocational 
training, as well as organizing a more fair distribution of wealth via classical 
Islamic institutions such as religious taxes (zakat) and foundations (waqf). In 
comparison to the FJP the policy suggestions of the party seem to put more em-




phasis on the role of the state in reforming society. This is also apparent in the 
view that the fight against drug abuse should start with state-initiated cam-
paigns against smoking and the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Here, ide-
as of state-controlled health care and normative Islamic positions converge. 
This combination of state-interventionism and Islamic norms sparked a discus-
sion about the question whether Al-Nour’s policies are going to affect negative-
ly on Egypt’s tourism industry. While the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood 
publicly denied any intentions to impose Islamic norms on tourists, the repre-
sentatives of Salafist parties seem more to be inclined to advocate a general 
prohibition of alcoholic drinks and the imposition of certain dress codes. At 
least, Salafist statements on this issue are of a more ambiguous character. 
Although having their roots in the same Islamist tradition, the FJP and the 
Salafists appear to move in slightly different trajectories. Without abandoning 
the Islamist framework, the FJP has come closer to accept some principles of 
societal pluralism whereas the Salafist parties have occupied more rigid posi-
tions previously represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet also the Salafist 
movement apparently has been affected by the ongoing transformation of 
Egyptian society. The active participation in electoral politics, the promotion of 
popular liberties or the principal acceptance of Egypt’s international obliga-
tions, in some statements even including the Camp David accords with Israel, 
are bold cases in point that show the fundamental revision of Salafist positions 
in Al-Nour’s political statements. The various Islamist parties in Egypt do not 
represent a homogeneous bloc, but a field of political contestation. In the course 
of the twentieth century, Islamist ideologies have developed in diverging direc-
tions meanwhile comprising a broad variety of attitudes from Jihadist radicals 
to democratically minded conservatives. The Arab spring – so far – has strongly 
confirmed this development. Therefore, it seems very plausible that the FJP is 
not interested in controlling parliamentarian politics with the help of the 
Salafists, as Sahar Sulaiman recently argued in the national-liberal paper al-
Waft (December 12, 2011). Rather, the FJP is likely to confront them in parlia-
ment in leading a majority-coalition together with non-religious alliance part-
ners. There is no doubt that the Salafist movement, too, has taken advantage of 
the new political opportunity structure provided by the Arab spring. However, 
this structural change might lead to an increasing fragmentation of the Islamist 
wing rather than to a dominance of Arab politics by Islamist blocs. 
 
 
